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We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed in the recent evolutionary literature
to a class of coordination games played simultaneously by the entire population. In these
games, payo¾s whence best replies are determined by a summary statistic of the population
strategy pro¿ le. We demonstrate that with simultaneous play, the equilibrium selection de-
pends crucially on how best responses to the summary statistic remain piece-wise constant.
In fact, all the strict Nash equilibria in the underlying stage game can be declared stochasti-
cally stable depending on how the best response mapping generates piece-wise constant best
responses. Furthermore, we showthatifthe bestresponse mapping is suÁcientlyasymmet-
ric, the expected waiting time untilthe unique stochastically stable state is reached is of the
same order as the mutation rate, even in the limit as the population size grows to in¿ nity.
Per Svejstrup Hansen
University ofCopenhagen, Department ofEconomics
Studiestraede 6, 1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark1 Introduction
We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993)
(henceforth KMR) to a class of coordination games played simultaneously by the entire
population. This is takentorefertoa contextwhere the interactionbetweenplayers are weak
and di¾ use and therefore does not lend themselves to modeling with pairwise interaction,
anonymous or otherwise.
We choose to model the weak and di¾use interaction among agents in such away that
individualpayo¾s depend on the player's own strategy and a summary statistic ofthe popu-
lation's strategy pro¿le. Speci¿cally, we assume that each player's strategy space is discrete
and consist of - linearly ordered strategies, and, as is often assumed in economic models,
the statistic is taken to be the mean of the current strategy distribution.
In the class of games studied in this paper players would try to coordinate since they
receive a strictly higher payo¾ from playing a strategy that matches the current population-
wide mean, than from playing any other strategy. This implis that there are - strict Nash
equilibria in this class ofgames. In addition we posit that the strategies are totally rankable
in the Pareto sense, and that coordinating on a higher value of the statistic gives the player
a strictly higher payo¾ than coordination on a lower one.
Note that since there are more average numbers than strategies, the bestresponse map-
ping cannot be one-to-one. Therefore best responses are piece-wise constant around a given
strategy. One of the contributions of this paper is to demonstrate that with simultaneous
play, the determination of the stochastically stable states depends crucially on how best
responses remain piece-wise constant. In fact all the strict Nash equilibria in the underlying
1stage game can be declared stochastically stable depending on the way piece-wise constant
bestresponses are speci¿ed. This resultholds even when we approximate a continuous strat-
egy space, i.e. when we by-pass any arti¿cial considerations that could be associated to the
discreteness ofthe players' strategy space. Furthermore, we show that ifpiece-wise constant
best responses are suÁ ciently asymmetric, the unique stochastically stable state consists of
all players playing one of their extreme strategies (which one depends on the way the asym-
metry goes). In this case the expected waiting time until the unique stochastically stable
state is reached is of the same order as the mutation rate, even in the limit as the popu-
lation size grows to in¿nity. Hence, unlike in many models of random pairing interaction,
convergence may in fact be very rapid even though the mutation rate is small.
Our motivation is threefold. First, much research in both traditional and evolutionary
game theory has been devoted to discriminate between equilibria in games that exhibit mul-
tiple strict Nash equilibria. In coordination games many hold the belief that the Pareto
dominant equilibrium stands out as a focal point, and thus should be selected as the equilib-
rium. Otherapplythe conceptofriskdominance introduced byHarsanyiand Selten (1988),
as the re¿nement criterion. In general, the two concepts, Pareto eÁ ciency and risk domi-
nance, di¾er. However, in symmetric pure coordination games they coincide. Kandori and
Rob (1995) show that for generalzz pure coordination games the Pareto eÁ cient equilib-
riumis selected as the unique stochasticallystable state,when players are randomlymatched
in pairs. In a recent article Robles (1997) considers a model which is similar in structure
to ours. That is, he studies a simultaneous play coordination game that also applies the
evolutionary dynamics of KMR. What Robles (1997) shows is that in coordination games
with simultaneous play and payo¾s determined by ´ averaged strategies,´the stochastically
2stable states are bounded away from the extreme strategies, including the Pareto eÁcient
Nash equilibrium. Apparently, there is a stark contrast between random pairing and simul-
taneous play. But as we show, the results in Robles (1997) are accounted for by the way he
de¿ nes the piece-wise constant best response mapping. The Pareto eÁ cient equilibrium may
be selected as stochastically stable as may any other strict Nash equilibrium, depending on
details of the best response mapping.
Second, one of the criticisms ofthe relevance ofthe concept ofstochastic stability is that
the speed of convergence may be very slow, indeed. The inclusion of a noise term meant
to capture for instance mutations or trembles, makes all the strict Nash equilibria occur
with positive probability. However, some may be more likely than others. If the long run
probability of a (subset of) strict Nash equilibria does not vanish as the noise approaches zero,
these states are stochastically stable. The problem is, as pointed out by Ellison (1993) among
others, that if the state initially is in a non-stochastically stable state, convergence may be
so slow that for all practical purposes, the stochastically stable states are never reached. In
fact, Binmore, Samuelson and Vaughan (1995) have estimated that going from the payo¾
dominant equilibrium to the risk dominant one in the KMR-model, has an expected wait of
d3d(￿1 periods, when the numberofplayers are d((, the noise-rate is dbd((,an dt h ep ay o ¾s
are such that at least nn of a player's opponents must play the risk dominant equilibrium
strategy to induce a switch in the agent in question's best reply. Our model which have
features in common with Ellison's (1996) analysis of step-by-step evolution, shows that if
piece-wise constant best responses are suÁ ciently asymmetric, convergence is of the same
order as the mutation rate even in the limit as the population size grows to in¿nity. Thus,
another important di¾erence between random pairing and simultaneous play.
3Thirdly, apart from Robles (1997), the evolutionary literature has not thoroughly anal-
ysed games with simultaneous play, even though Crawford (1991, 1997) forcefully argues for
introducing genuine simultaneous interaction into this literature. What seems relevant in
many models of economic theory, be it of oligopolies, macroeconomic coordination failure
models or models of individual consumers' demand for goods such as popular restaurant
seats or theater tickets (Becker, 1990), is an interaction structure characterized by simulta-
neous playrather than random pairing, anonymous or otherwise. In addition, agents react to
some average ofotheragents' behaviour in these models. Hence, we argue thatwhatis rele-
vant for many economic applications is a simultaneous play interaction pattern with a payo¾
structure determined in part by the mean of the current strategy distribution. However,
from a game theoretical perspective the equilibrium selection mechanism in these games is
rather discomforting, since all the strict Nash equilibria of the underlying stage game can be
selected as partofthe setofstochasticallystable states byan appropriate speci¿cation ofthe
best response mapping. Unless the best response mapping generates suÁ ciently asymmetric
piece-wise constant best responses in which case our model has strong predictive power, as
well as fast convergence to the predicted stochastically stable states.
A natural question that arises is how the best response mapping ought to be de¿ned?
Robles postulates without any further argumentation that population averages, which lie
between two adjacentdiscrete strategychoices, should be transformed onto the nearestone of
these strategies. Thatis, ifa value ofthe average is,say , n3xd the optimalindividualstrategy
is to play ;, whereas it is to play n if the population average is n3;31 In pure coordination
games, this way ofde¿ning the best response mapping does not seem appealing. In this class
1Robles (1997) breaks ties such that n3x( is mapped onto ;.
4ofgames, individualpayo¾s are positive ifthe player's choice ofstrategy equals the summary
statistic, otherwise individual payo¾ s are zero. The strategies are also totally rankable in
the Pareto sense, such that coordinating on a higher value of the summary statistic give the
players a strictly higher payo¾ than coordination on a lower one. We argue that if players
look at their payo¾s, the natural way of specifying the best response mapping is such that
anypopulation average slightlyabove a discrete strategy ,oughtto leada playertochoose the
next higher strategy. This gives the player a higher payo¾ and involves no greater risk since
both actions are equally secured.2 These theoretical arguments suggest that a symmetric
de¿ nition of the best response mapping in pure coordination games is questionable. However,
how individuals are likely to perceive what is a best reply to a given statistic is an empirical
matter. After all, the perception of best responses is not a choice variable but intrinsic to
agents.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 serves for motivation and heuristics. It
presents the general idea by way of a simple example. Sections 3 and 4 turn the intuition
into formal analysis. Section 3 provides the general model, and section 4 states a general
possibility theorem saying that, in symmetric coordination games with simultaneous play and
an average payo¾ structure, anystrictNash equilibrium can be selected as partofthe setof
stochasticallystable states byanappropriate de¿nitionofpiece-wise constantbestresponses.
To illustrate the theorem, we calculate numerically the set of stochastically stable states for
a given error rate and di¾erent ways of de¿ning piece-wise constant best responses. Section
5c o n s i d e r st h er a t eo fc o n v e r g e n c ea n ds t e p - b y - s t e pe v o l u t i o n ,w h i l es e c t i o n6d i s c u s s e st h e
2A secure action is an action whose lowest payo¾ is at least as large as the lowest payo¾ to any other
feasible action. (Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil, 1991).
5results and suggests how the best response mapping could be de¿ned for di¾erent classes of
coordination games.
2A n E x a m p l e
Consider a situation where a ¿nite number of players, each having the same ¿nite set of
strategies, play a simultaneous coordination game. Individualpayo¾s are determined by the
player's own action and a population-wide average ofthe opponent players' strategychoices.3
For this class of games, we show that any strict Nash equilibrium of the underlying stage
game can be stochastically stable depending on how the best response mapping generates
piece-wise constant best reponses. This willbe derived formally in the following sections but
before addressing the theoretical issues, we shall illustrate the point by a simple example.
Consider a symmetric pure coordination game with ] )players and - )xlinearly
ordered strategies for each of them. Let $wE, D be the payo¾ to an individual playing
strategyE;\ d ,1 ,n ,; ,x iwhen the mean of the population's current strategy pro¿le equals
 . Since there are more average numbers   than strategies E, the best response mapping,
4w D, cannotbe one-to-one. Speci¿cally, suppose the ´ level-set´4￿dwED)> E y, ELdyD
is a half-openintervallforsome constanty;>(,dD. In other words, we de¿ne an integer-value
function which takes   ; >E  y, ELdy DE , such that the best response is piece-wise
3The opponents are taken in a wide sense, i.e. the player himself ¿gures among the opponents. If the
players knew they could alter the population-wide average by their strategy choices, non of the results in
this paper would change in qualitative terms.
6constant around a given integer-value of E.H e n c e ,
4 w   D)4 w E D)E
whenever Ey cELdy .
Introducing myopic bestresponses and mutation dynamics as in Kandoriand Rob (1995),
we follow Y oung (1993) in de¿ning the stochastically stable states of the game as those
states which are the roots ofthe leastresistantpaths, where the resistance in this case is the
minimum number ofplayers who must mutate in order to move from a state where everyone
plays E t oas t a t ew h e r ee v e r y o n ep l a y sE IW )E . Denote the minimum resistance of going
from E to EI by EEI. It has been shown in Kandori and Rob (1995) that only adjacent
states need to be compared for obtaining the stochasticallystable states in pure coordination
games. Thus, we have to compare E,ELd and ELd,E where E ;\ d ,333,;i. Nowassume the
integer-function de¿ nes pieces symmetrically; that is, y ) d
1. This is the case in Robles (1997)
and as we willdemonstrate, the key to understand his equilibrium selection mechanism. Set
up the tree as belowwhere the numbers above and belowthe arrows indicate the resistances
of going upward and downward, respectively.






















It is easily seen that state n is stochastically stable since it is easier (i.e. requires fewer
mutations) to go from d to 1 than the opposite way. Similarly for 1 to n.I ta l s oi n v o l v e sf e w e r
7mutations to go from x to ; than from ; to x. The same applies for ; to n. For comparison
assume instead that y ) x
￿. This makes more numbers go up to E than for y ) d
1. Setting
up a new tree, we observe that the stochastically stable states are n and ;.






















This shows that just a small change in how the average is transformed onto a strategy
choice, signi¿cantlyalters the equilibrium selection. Bychanging the pieces slightlyin favour
of going upward, (by increasing y ; >(,dD), the stochastically stable state(s) are biased
towards the Pareto eÁ cient outcome. The example suggests that by an even higher choice
ofy ; >(,dD, players would coordinate on the Pareto eÁ cient equilibrium. Similar arguments
apply for tending towards the least eÁ cient equilibrium {d} . I ft h es a m eg a m ei sp l a y e d
with a random pairing interaction structure, Kandori and Rob (1995) show that the Pareto
eÁ cient equilibrium is stochastically stable. So clearly there is a di¾ erence between random
pairing and simultaneous play, but as the above example illustrates, the di¾ erence seems to lie
in howeach player's best response remains piece-wise constant in response to other players'
averaged strategy pro¿le, and not so much in the di¾erence in the interaction structure
per se. The way of de¿ ning piece-wise constant best responses determines the equilibrium
selection.
83T h e M o d e l
Following Robles (1997), we consider a ¿nite population [ of size ] composed of players
z ;[U) \d,1,333,]i.A t e a c h t i m e 0 )d , 1 ,333 these individuals play simultaneously a
symmetric coordination game with linearly ordered strategies E ;&U) \d,1,333,-i.4
Individual payo¾, $wE, wXDD, depends on own action E ;&and the population-wide




E'wplayers usingED, which is observable.5 The (unobservable) state
X )w X d,333,X-D is a vector, whose Eth element, XE, represents the number of players using
strategyE;& 3Thus, the state space ofthe system is chosen equalto -],w h er e-is the
strategy grid introduced above. We assume that $wE,ED c$ w E I ,E ID whenever EcE I ,
and $wE,EID c$ w E I,E IDwhenever EW)EI.
The stage game described above, exhibits - strict Nash equilibria in which all players
choose the same strategy. In addition, the Nash equilibria are totally ranked in the Pareto
sense; when all players choose strategy 1 the least eÁ cient equilibrium is generated, and
Pareto optimum results when every player plays her highest strategy -3
Like Kandori and Rob (1995) we assume that strategy adjustment is not instantaneous
but is subject to some friction. Speci¿cally , it is assumed that at every 0 )d , 1 ,333 each
player takes an independent draw from a Bernoulli trial. With probability wd  
D ; w(,dD
this draw produces the outcome ´ do not learn´and the player stays with her strategy. With
the complementary probability 
 the draw produces the outcome ´ learn´ .I nt h i sc a s et h e
4 Schelling (1973) introduced the simultaneous play modelin economics. In biology the term ´ playing the
¿eld´is used to indicate interaction with a whole population, (Maynard Smith, 1978).
5Robles (1997) considers games where individualpayo¾s depend on own action and convex combinations
of the order statistics of the population's current strategy con¿guration. It should be noted though that the
results in our paper generalize, in a qualitatively way, to all convex combinations of order statistics as long
as allorder statistics have positive weight.
9player is able to observe the average ofthe population's current strategy pro¿le and switches
to a best response to the period 0 average.6 We assume that she believes her opponents to
stay with their strategies and that her choice has a negligible e¾ect on the average. Hence,
her myopic best response is to match the current value of the mean.
We assume the existence of a partition of the real interval >d,-Hinto neighbourhoods
(vicinities) ~d,333,~- of d,333,- respectively such that the best response
4w DU )s  8 s -$ w N ,  D
is constant on each ~E,E)d ,333,-. We shall therefore speak of piece-wise constant best
responses. For tractability we assume that
~E )> d ,-H>Ey,E Ldy D
for some y ; >(,dD.I no t h e rw o r d s ,
4 w   D)4 w E D)E
whenever Ey cELdy .
In addition to the myopic best-response dynamics, idiosyncratic behaviour is modelled
in the following way. For all 0, each player z ;[is subject to some probability k(of
´ mutating´ , in which case the player chooses any strategy E ;&in a purely arbitrarily
6It is without importance that the player observes the average and not the state X since the payo¾ to the
player depends on this average and not on how many players who are playing the di¾erent strategies.
10manner with positive probability on each E ;& . These events, which occur after the
best-response adjustments, are assumed to be independent across players and over time.
The composition ofmyopic bestresponses and mutations generates a discrete-time Markov-
process over the ¿nite state space C, whose transition matrix is denoted hwD)w  XXIwDD3
An element XXIwD represents the transition probability of moving to state XI at time 0Ld
conditional on being in state X at time 0.T h e´ mutation-free´dynamics itself corresponds
to hw(D.
The presence of mutations implies that every transition has positive probability. It is a
standard result that such Markov chains have a unique stationary probability distribution.





Based upon arguments in Freidlin and Wentzell(1984), Foster and Y oung (1990) have shown
that this limit exists and they called it the stochastically stable distribution. Call the support
of this limit distribution the set of stochastically stable states and denote it .
As a ¿ rst step towards computing the set of stochastically stable states we will identify
the set of the recurrent classes under hw(D. Denote this set  and letE be the state where
allplayers play strategy E.
Proposition 1 Using the arithmetic mean as a summary statistic, the set of recurrent
classes in the unperturbed game is )\\di,\1i,333,\-ii for any integer-value func-
tion {NQy U b  .,d e ¿ n e db y {NQywDU ){  Q y)Fwhenever  ; >Fy,F Ldy D ,Fbeing
11an integer and y ; >(,dD3
Proof. If X ) E then   ) E3 Therefore 4wED)E ,i r r e s p e c t i v e l yo f{NQy ,y;>(,dD.
Hence, E ; 3 If XI W) E but { wXIDQy ) E, then there are individuals who do not play a
best response to the current state XI. Letallthose players revise theirstrategychoices. Since
they will all change their strategy to E, E i sr e a c h e di no n es t e p .C o m b i n e dw i t ht h ef a c t
that E is an absorbing set this implies that XI is a transient state and therefore XI b ; 3
In order to determine  ￿, we need to know the relative size of the transition probabilities,
XXIwD, that are converging to zero. Since mutations are independent across players and
over time, the elements of hwD are polynomials in . In fact, the leading terms of XXIwD
have the form ￿wX,XID,w h e r e w X,XID is the number of mutations needed to move from X to
XI. Hence, the number of mutations corresponds to the order (in )o ft h ec o r r e s p o n d i n g
transition probability. The stochastically stable states are precisely those states which can
be reached from any other state with the fewest number of mutations. In addition, since
 w(D is the limit distribution of hw(D, it puts zero probability on every transient state. We
may therefore restrict attention to the recurrent states to determine the set of stochastically
stable states, .
We now consider moving between two distinct recurrent states E and EI, E W) EI,
E, EI ;. For each pair of distinct recurrent states E and EI, E W) EI,a nm m I -
path is a sequence of states  )w X d ,X 1,333,XRD which begins in E and ends in EI for
E W) EI. The resistance ofthis path, wD, is the sum ofthe resistances ofits edges, that is
wD)
 R ￿ d
> )d wXd,X >LdD where wX>,X >LdD ; ]( \  iis the number of mutations required
to move from state X> to state X>Ld.L e t EEI be the least resistance over allEEI-paths .
12In fact,
EEI )8 $ t ￿ U X d) ￿ E,XR)￿EI wD3
A tree rooted at vertex EI (an EI-tree), is a set of -  d directed edges, each for one
recurrent state, such that from every vertex di¾erent from EI, there is a unique directed
path in the tree to EI. The weight on the directed edge E  EI is EEI. The resistance ofa
rooted tree, x, is the sum ofthe resistances EEI on the - d edges that composes it. Let
xwEID be the set of EItrees. Following Y oung (1993), we de¿ne the stochastic potential
of the recurrent state EI by
EI )8 $ t x; xw ￿ E ID
3
w ￿ E,￿EIID;x EEII
We now state the theorem for determining the stochastically stable states (Y oung, 1993,
Theorem 4).
Theorem 2 The stochastically stable states, E ; , are exactlythe state(s)with minimum
stochastic potential.
4 Equilibrium Selection
In this section we characterize the set of stochastically stable states for the average payo¾
games described in section 3. Since the stochastic potential of E ;  is de¿ ned to be the
minimum resistance over all trees rooted at E, standard tree constructions determine which
E has the lowest stochastic potential.
13When a player z ;[learns, her myopic best response is to match the integer-discretised
mean of the population's current strategy pro¿le. Hence, to assess the likelihood of a move
from the state Eto EI, we need to ¿nd the minimum number of mutations required to
change the average from E to EI. Since large jumps in an individual strategy change the
average more then smalljumps, having players mutate to extreme strategies is often the ¿rst
step along a minimum resistance path. If d  EcE Ic_-, then evidently there are
more strategies above E than EI. This means that one mutation to _ has a larger impact
on the average when the state is E, than when the state is EI. Therefore, the number of
mutations needed to destabilize equilibrium E upwards must be less than or equal to the
number of mutations needed to destabilize equilibrium EI i nt h es a m ed i r e c t i o n .As i m i l a r
argument applies to the number of mutations needed to make the transition from a higher
to a lower state.7 Furthermore, a slight modi¿cation of Proposition 3.2 in Robles (1997),
allowing for a generalspeci¿cation ofpiece-wise constant best responses, implies that to ¿nd
the minimum resistance path from E we only need to consider adjacent recurrent states,
i.e. E￿d and ELd. Therefore, to ¿nd the resistance for the transition E  ELd,w en e e d
to ¿nd the number of players, de¿ned as E,ELd, who must mutate to - such thatthe best




] E  E Ldy .N o w , d e ¿ n e E,ELd as the minimum number of
players who must play - for the above expression to be satis¿ed. Clearly E,ELd depends
on y.I nf a c t , E,ELdwyDU )8 $ t
+




. Similarly, for the transition
ELd  E,we need to ¿nd the minimum number of players who must mutate to d in order
for an wELdD-player's bestresponse tobe toplaya strategyE,assumingthe wELdD-player
7This is what we state formally in Lemma 8.
14receives a learning draw. This is de¿ned as ELd,EwyDU )8 $ t
\




For completeness set -,-Ld ) d,( )  38
The following proposition yields a simple characterization of the resistance between two
states in .
Proposition 3 E,ELdwyD) E,ELdwyD and ELd,EwyD) E Ld,EwyD3
Proof. Appendix.
The next proposition states the conditions for E to be supported by the stochastically
stable states. It asserts that E is a (part of) the stochastically stable states if and only
if more mutations are required to move the state from E to E￿d and from E to ELd
than the other way around. In other words, each inward resistance must be less than the
corresponding outward one.
Proposition 4 E ;  i¾ E￿d,EwyD  E,E￿dwyD and ELd,EwyD  E,ELdwyD3
Proof. The proof follows with a slight modi¿cation from Robles (1997, Proposition 3.2).
From the de¿nitions of E,ELdwyD and ELd,EwyD it follows that the resistance between
two states in  depends on how best responses are piece-wise constant. The next proposition
gives necessary and suÁ cient conditions for the lowest and highest strategies, respectively,
to be stochastically stable.
8One potential problem is that it might be possible for ￿E,ELd players who mutate to -,t or a i s et h e
mean above the newstate ELd , but not exactly to ELd 3Lemma 3.1 in Robles (1997) shows that in that
case players can mutate to a strategy _c-and reach ELdand that ￿E,ELd ￿ d players is not suÁ cient
to increase the mean to ELd .
15Proposition 5 Let y ; >(,dD.i )I f y ;
J
( , ] L - ￿ d
]-
o
















then - ;  uniquely.
Proof. A necessary and suÁ cient condition for - b ;  is that the number of mutations
required to move the state from - to -￿d is strictly less than the number of mutations
required to move the state the opposite way. This follows from Proposition 4. In fact, using
Proposition 3, and the de¿nitions of -￿d,-wyD and -,-￿dwyD, a necessary and suÁ cient
condition for - b ;  is y]
-￿d Ldc
wd￿yD]
-￿w-￿dD. From this expression it is easy to establish ii).
The corresponding argument concerning i) is essentially identical.
To prove uniqueness, allthat is required is that -￿d,- c -,-￿d for - to be unique,
and 1,d c d,1 for d to be unique. Then condition iii) and iv) follows from the de¿ nition
of  and .
In Robles (1997), where the integer-value function is de¿ned symmetrically, i.e., y ) d
1,t h e
stochasticallystable states are boundedawayfromthe extreme strategies formostparameter
con¿gurations. The following corollary gives conditions for this to happen.
Corollary 6 Let ]  x, -  n and y) d
13 Then i) d b ; , ii) - b ; 3
Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 5.
We are now ready to state the main theorem, saying that in symmetric coordination
games with simultaneous play and an average payo¾ structure, all the strict Nash equilibria
of the underlying stage game can be decleared stochastically stable by an appropriate choice
of how the population-wide average is transformed into a discrete strategy choice.
16Theorem 7 If ]  x and -  n, any of the recurrent states E ;  for E ;&can be
selected as stochastically stable by appropriate choice of y ; >(,dD.
Before we prove the theorem, we need to prove that the number of mutations needed to
destabilize equilibrium E upwards (downwards) is less (larger) than or equal to the number
of mutations needed to destabilize equilibrium ELd i nt h es a m ed i r e c t i o n .
Lemma 8 If d  Ec- ,then E,ELdwyD  ELd,EL1wyD and EL1,ELdwyD  ELd,EwyD3
Proof. From Proposition 3 we know that the resistances can be expressed in terms of 's
and 's. Then, we have E,ELdwyD)8 $ t
+











3 Hence E,ELdwyD  ELd,EL1wyD3
Similarly, EL1,ELdwyD)8 $ t
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3 Therefore,EL1,ELdwyD  ELd,EwyD,an dt h e
Lemma is established.
Proof. (Theorem 7). From Proposition 5 we know that we can select d as a stochastically





.Callthe upper bound ofthis intervalyd3k From the





3 Denote the lower
bound ofthis intervaly-. It is easy to verifythat yd cy - when ]  x,-n .
Observe that for all E UdEc- , E,ELdwyD is non-increasing in y ; >(,dD3 This
follows directly from the de¿ nition of E,ELdwyD.I nf a c t ,f o rag i v e ny)y ,as m a l li n c r e a s e
in y implies a change in E,ELdwyD ;\  d ,( i ,for d  Ec-. Similarly, a small increase in
y implies a change in ELd,EwyD ;\ ( ,d i ,f o rdcE-.
17To select any E ;  choose y ; >(,y dH.I f E )d ,t h e n d; 3If Ekd , then choose y
slightly above yd. As notedabove,this increase inyimplies a change in E,ELd ;\  d ,( iand
in ELd,E ;\ ( ,d i , and from Lemma 8 it follows that the changes in the resistances E,ELd
(ELd,E) are monotonically non-decreasing (non-increasing). If the increase in y changes the
resistance such that the conditions given in Proposition 4 are satis¿ed, then E ; .I f
not, then continue to increase y until they are. If E ) -,t h e nw eh a v et oi n c r e a s eyuntil
y-  ycd 3Note that y- c d for all ]  x,-n 3In fact, j$8
-￿ 
y- ) ]￿d




- c d3 If Ec-, it follows from Lemma 8 that the conditions willbe satis¿ed
for ycy - and the proof is complete.
To illustrate how the probability distribution accumulates on the di¾ erent Nash equilibria
of the underlying stage game, we can solve for the stationary distribution as a function of
the discretisation parameter y and the mutation rate  directly. The results for  )( 3 (d
and selected values of y i nag a m ew i t h])xplayers each having - )nstrategies are
summarized in Table 4.1. (We explain how probabilities are calculated in the appendix.)
Table 4.1. Long-run probabilities
18d 1 n
y ) ￿
d(   3E
y ) ￿
d(  3;MM 3;
y ) x
d(  3Ex 
y ) n
d( 3; 3;MM 
y ) d
d( 3E  
A´  ´indicates less than 3(x probability.
5 Rate of Convergence
In this section we argue that the waybest responses to the summarystatistic remain piece-
wise constant has important consequences for the expected waiting time required to reach
the stochastically stable states. Speci¿cally it is argued that if the best response mapping
is suÁ ciently asymmetric, i,e.y is close to zero or one, then the expected wait to reach the
stochastically stable states is relatively short, even if the mutation rate is small. Moreover,
in the limit when y approaches zero or one, the expected wait remains of the same order
as the mutation rate even when the population size grows to in¿nity. Hence, convergence
is fast also in the second sense discussed in Ellison (1993, pp. 1060-1063). This is due to
the fact that the system can easily escape the basin of attraction of each Nash equilibrium
except the unique stochasticalle stable state d or -.
The observation that evolution is more rapid when it may proceed via a series of small
19steps between intermediate recurrent states is analysed in Ellison (1996). Ellison gives the
following biological example to provide intuition: Consider two di¾ erent environments in
which three major genetic mutations are necessary to produce the more ¿t animal j from
animal ?. In the ¿rst environment each single genetic mutation on its own, provides an
increase in ¿tness that allows the mutants to take over the population. In the second, all
three genetic mutations must occur simultaneously to create the animal with a higher ¿tness
than ?. Ifmutations are rare phenomena, the expected waiting time to see animalj being
created is much larger in the latter case. Hence, the large cumulative change from ? to j
seems more plausible when gradual changes are possible.
As the analysis in section 4 shows, the minimum resistance paths in coordination games
with simultaneous playare constructed between adjacent recurrent classes. Therefore, evolu-
tionarychanges occurstep-by-step. As a result,the expected waitto reach the stochastically
stable state from any given state in Ellison's step-by-step model and in the present one is
the same.9
To show that convergence is fast when the best response mapping is suÁ ciently asym-
metric we follow Ellison (1996) and de¿ ne 8s-X;C PwX,,Das the maximalexpected wait
until a state belonging to the set  is ¿rst reached given that play begins in state X ; C
when the mutation rate is k( . If the expected wait is small, convergence is fast and 
can be regarded as a good prediction of play, even in the medium run.
From the de¿nition of resistance, i.e. from Proposition 4, it follows that d or - can be
reached via a chain ofsingle mutations when y is close to zero or one. More importantly, this
9Kaarbxe (1998) shows that it is easy to construct examples of simultanous play coordination games
where Ellison's analysis is not applicable.
20result holds also when the population size approaches in¿nity. As a result, the convergence
rate is independent of the population size, ], and convergence is fast also in the second
sense discussed in Ellison (1993).
Proposition 9 If i) y ; >(, d
]H or ii) y ; >d  d
],dD, 8s-X;C PwX,,D is of order ￿d as
(3 Moreover, in the limit when y approaches zero or one, this result holds true when the
population size subsequently grows to in¿nity.
Proof. The proof follows from the de¿nition of the resistances. If -￿d,- )dwe know
that the resistance of going upward from any other state is also one. This follows from the
fact that the 's are non-decreasing and is proven formally in Lemma 8. Hence - ;  is
reached with just one mutation. Correspondingly for case i).
6 Discussion
Theorem 7 demonstrates that in coordination games with simultaneous play and payo¾s
determined by ´ average strategies´ , any of the strict Nash equilibria of the stage game
can be stochastically stable. Which equilibria depend solely on the way the best response
mapping transforms the average of other players' strategy pro¿le onto a discrete strategy.
This implies that when di¾ erent game structures are compared, one should be careful in
ascribing di¾ erences in the equilibrium selection to the game as such. What is crucial is
how best responses remain piece-wise constant. If for instance, piece-wise constant best
responses are de¿ned symmetrically the stochasticallystable states are bounded awayfrom
the extreme strategies. This leads Robles (1997) to conclude that there is a stark contrast
21in equilibrium selection between coordination games with random pairing and games with
a simultaneous play interaction structure. He reaches this conclusion because Kandori and
Rob (1995) show that the stochastically stable state is Pareto eÁ cient in pure coordination
games where players are randomly matched in pairs. However, this is not in contrast to
simultaneous play, but merely a result of the speci¿c way Robles de¿nes piece-wise constant
best responses. It should be noted, though, that as the number of players increases, y-,
i.e. the lower bound on y ; >(,dD that makes - ; , goes to one. This indicates that
for a given de¿nition of piece-wise constant best responses, it becomes increasingly diÁ cult
to coordinate on eÁ cient outcomes when the number of players is large. This result ¿ts
intuition as well as much research (see e.g. KMR, V an Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990,
1991) and Crawford (1995)).
A natural question arises though. Namely, how are individuals most likely to perceive
y ; >(,dD, and hence their best responses? Note that this question is not tantamount to
asking how an experimenter would de¿ne the best response mapping. He can choose any
integer value function to his liking (and hence determine payo¾s), but that does not imply
a speci¿ c behaviour of players. Their best replies depend on their perception of what is a
bestresponse to a given statistic. Unfortunately, we knowofno experiments like the ones in
Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1991) where the payo¾s (hence best replies) are determined
by some averages, that could shed light on this issue. Intuitively, however, it is diÁ cult to
understand why the best response mapping should be de¿ned and percieved as symmetric in
pure coordination games. In this class of games, individual payo¾s are positive if the player
match the current average, otherwise individual payo¾s are zero. Hence, all actions are
equally secured (see footnote 1). The strategies are Pareto ranked, such that coordinating
22on a higher value of the summary statistic gives the players a strictly higher payo¾ than
coordinating on a lower one. Thus why should a population-wide average ofsay, ;3;M, induce
a player to play strategy ; instead of x? In particular since playing x gives the player a higher
payo¾ and in addition involves no greater risk than playing ;. Though the experiments in
Van Huyck et al(1991) do not cover this case, some indication in favour ofthis argument can
be found in the experiments concerning the median as the payo¾ relevantsummarystatistic.
In one treatment they considered a case where alldisequilibria outcomes give a payo¾ ofzero
(the period game ). This resembles our pure coordination game with an average payo¾
structure if the median is interpreted as a proxy for the average. In that experiment, they
¿ nd that everyone playing their highest strategy is likely to be the equilibrium outcome.
Thus agents may perceive y as close to one even though an experimenter has de¿ned it
di¾erently.
It is also worth pointing out that pure coordination games are potential games, and
Mondererand Shapley(1996)showthatforpotentialgames with an average payo¾ structure,
the unique strategypro¿le that maximises the potential, is the Pareto eÁ cient one. This too,
clearly lends support to our claim that for an experimenter an asymmetric way of de¿ning
the best response mapping is not something that should be dismissed. In fact, it actually
accords with theoretical results as well as empirical equilibrium observations.
For more general coordination games we also expect that if the payo¾s the players get
when missing the summary statistic di¾er for di¾erent strategies, both de¿ning and perceiv-
ing the best response mapping symmetrically is highly unlikely to be a focal point.
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26Appendix
ProofofProposition 3. We shallshowthatthe transition E  ELdfor d  EcE L
d-can happen after E,ELdwyDmutations and not fewer. The corresponding argument
concerning any transition ELdEfor d  EcELd- is essentially identical and
omitted.
First, note that after E,ELdwyD mutations to -, t h eb e s tr e s p o n s ef o ra nE -player, who
learns, is to play strategy ELd.(This follows trivially from the de¿ nition of E,ELdwyD)3 Call
the state that results if, starting at E, E,ELdwyD players mutate to -, for Xd. Suppose
{ wXdDQy ) ELd 3Since it is assumed that at every 0 )d ,1 ,333 each player enjoys a strictly
positive probability of learning, let all players revise their strategy choices. From the best-
response dynamics it follows that all players adjust to strategy E Ldand ELd is reached
with E,ELdwyD mutations. If { wXdDQ kELd , then there exists mutations to _c-such
that { wXIDQ ) E Ld 3(See footnote 9). Here XI is the state that results if, starting at E,
E,ELdwyD players mutate to _. Again let all players learn. Since 4w wXIDD ) ELd,t h e ya l l
adjust to ELd3 Hence, E is reached with E,ELdwyD mutations.
W eno wsho wt hat E,ELdwyDd mutations are not suÁ cient to reach ELd3 Let the state
which results afterE,ELdwyDdmutations be X1. From the de¿ nition of E,ELdwyD,i tf o l -
lows thatthe best response foran E-player, who learns, is to play E3 Now, let an --player
receive the learning draw. Her best response is by de¿ nition to play E as well. Call the
resulting state after the -- p l a y e rh a sp l a y e dh e rb e s tr e s p o n s ef o rX n3Since  wXnD c wX1D,
ELd is not reachable from E with E,ELdwyD  d mutations.
27Calculation ofthe Stationary Distribution. The composition ofmyopic best responses
and mutations generates an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain overthe ¿nite state space
C. We nowshowhowto compute the unique invariantdistribution,  wD,k( ,forthe games
d e s c r i b e di nt h i sp a p e r .
To simplify the computation burden, we assume that each player z ;[enjoys the
probability of revising her strategy choice with probability one, i.e. 
 )d . We refer to this
as the deterministic best-response dynamics. It is called deterministic since every player
switches to a best replyin everyperiod.10 Therefore, from anyinitialstate X, the determin-
istic best-response dynamics implies a transition to the state E,w h e r eE;&is the best
reply to  wXD. This transition happens before the mutation dynamics. The probability of the
one-period transition X )w 7 d,333,7E,333,7-D  XI )w 7 I
d,333,7I
E,333,7I
-D, is then the probability
of the transition E  XI via the mutation dynamics, where 4w wXDD ) E.
When a player mutates, we simply assume she chooses any strategy E ;&with a























where, 7Ew(Dis the number of players playing strategy 7 w h od on o tm u t a t e , w E Dis the
10The assumption is not crucial for the point emphasized in Table 4.1. First, each player's probability
of revising her strategy choice can be chosen arbitrarily close to 1. Secondly, the least resistance paths are
always constructed with transitions between adjacentrecurrentsets. Hence, assuming allplayers learn every
period does not change the number of mutations in the least resistance paths.

















To illustrate the above formula, let - )nand ] )x 3In this game there are 21 states.
Now assume y ) d
1, X )w d ,; ,(D and XI )w d ,1 ,1D3 In state X,   ) ￿
x and { wXDQd
1 )1 3Hence,
4w D)1 ,a n d 1is reached via the deterministic best-response dynamics. For a given value
of , the probability of the transition X  XI is then the probability of the transition 1  XI















































When the transition matrix, hwD, is calculated, the stationary distribution  wD is found
by power iteration on hwD until it converges. (See e.g. Stewart (1994) for a systematic and
detailed treatment of the numerical solution of Markov chains.)
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